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Don't Fence Me In:' Louisiana's Fourth Circuit
Expands "Voluntariness" Under Louisiana Civil
Code Article 693

I. INTRODUCTION

In Petrovich v. Trabeau,2 the fourth circuit court of appeal held
that a landowner whose estate became enclosed due to a sheriffs
seizure and sale was not entitled to a legal servitude of passage
because the enclosure was caused by the landowner's voluntary act
or omission under Louisiana Civil Code article 693.' This holding
expands upon a consistent line of Louisiana jurisprudence that
limited article 693 "voluntariness" to instances in which an owner
caused his dilemma by selling his own property and becoming
landlocked without reserving passage.4 Essentially, article 693's
application was limited to enclosures resulting from juridical acts.
If Petrovich is followed, article 693 may apply to situations in
which the landowner's enclosure results from juridical facts, i.e.,
debts arising from the fault of the landowner, which are ultimately
remedied with the sheriffs sale. Thus, Petrovich v. Trabeau has
changed the way that future courts will interpret Louisiana Civil
Code article 693.
The facts of Petrovich are presented in Part II, Section A. Part
II, Section B analyzes the past influences of article 693 and
interpretations that Louisiana courts previously gave this article.
Part II, Section C presents the court's analysis in Petrovich, and
demonstrates that it is a derogation from previous interpretations of
article 693. Finally, Part Ell examines the potential results and flaws
of Petrovich v. Trabeau and concludes that an ambiguity has been
created on how to interpret Louisiana Civil Code article 693.

Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1. The title is adopted from the song "Don't Fence Me In," written by Cole
Porter, that was a hit for Bing Crosby and the Andrews Sisters during World War
II. For the lyrics and a history of this song, see http://www.kcmetro.cc.mo.us/penn
valley/biology/lewis/crosby/DontFence.html (last accessed Feb. 3, 2003).
2. 780 So. 2d 1258 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied,793 So. 2d 1251 (2001).

3. Id. at 1260.
4. Leblanc v. Thibodeaux, 615 So. 2d 295,299 (La. 1993). See also infra §§
II(B)(3) and II(B)(4).
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II. PETROVICH V. TRABEAU

A. Factualand ProceduralBackground
In Petrovich v. Trabeau,6 Luke Petrovich sought a right of
passage over Karen Trabeau's property.' In 1965, Petrovich bought
a large tract of land that included a thirty-foot right of passage over
an adjacent tract of land giving him access to a parish highway from
his mother! In 1993, Petrovich and Trabeau acquired the remaining
interest in the property surrounding these tracts resulting in Petrovich
now having access to a state highway. After this transaction,
Petrovich and Trabeau executed a partition giving Petrovich
ownership of the land fronting the state highway and Trabeau
ownership of the land fronting the parish highway. In this agreement,
Petrovich specifically abandoned the right of passage that originally
encumbered Trabeau's property because he now had access to the
state highway.9
In 1997, Petrovich lost ownership of part ofhis land to a creditor
in a sheriff's sale."0 Consequently, Petrovich was left only with a
landlocked parcel of land abutting the Trabeau property." Petrovich
filed a petition requesting passage over Trabeau's property. 2 The
trial court determined that Petrovich was not entitled to a right of
passage because he had become landlocked by his own "voluntary act
or omission."' 3 Petrovich appealed, and the fourth circuit upheld the
trial court's finding.' 4 The Louisiana Supreme Court subsequently
denied writs. 5

5. A copy of the plat of land that was the subject of this litigation is attached
as Appendix "A" to this note.
6. Petrovich v. Trabeau, 780 So. 2d 1258, 1261 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 793 So. 2d 1251 (2001).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1259.

9. Id.

10. The court does not indicate the act or omission that led to the sheriff's sale.
See infra § III.
11. Petrovich,780 So. 2d at 1259.
12. In the opinion, the court stated that Petrovich requested a right of passage
over the tract of land he lost in the sheriff's sale. Id. Additionally, the case
pleadings indicate that Petrovich sought passage over Trabeau's property. See
Plaintiff's Petition for Injunction and Damages, Twenty-Fifth Judicial District
Court, State of Louisiana (1997) (No. 42-462). However, the court's reasoning
focused on why Petrovich was not entitled to passage over Trabeau's property.
13. Reasons for Judgment at page 5, Petrovich v. Trabeau, Twenty-Fifth
Judicial District Court, State of Louisiana (1998) (No. 42-462).
14. Petrovich,780 So. 2d at 1261.
15. Petrovich v. Trabeau, 793 So. 2d 1251 (La. 2001).
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B. Relevant Law
1. Article 693 andPriorLaw That Influenced Article 693
Louisiana, like other civil law jurisdictions, grants a legal
servitude of passage across neighboring lands to an enclosed estate.16
There are two types of legal servitudes for a right of passage in
Louisiana: the indemnified right of passage and the gratuitous right
of passage. Louisiana Civil Code article 689 defines the indemnified
right of passage and provides that "[t]he owner of an estate that has
no access to a public road may claim a right of passage over
neighboring property to the nearest public road."' 7 The enclosed
estate must utilize the shortest route to exercise passage, and the
estate burdened by the passage must be indemnified.
The gratuitous right ofpassage is defined in Louisiana Civil Code
article 694, which provides that:
When in the case of partition, or a voluntary alienation of an
estate or of a part thereof, property alienated or partitioned
becomes enclosed, passage shall be furnished gratuitously by
the owner of the land on which passage was previously
exercised, even ifit is not the shortest route to the public road,
and even if the act of alienation or partition does not mention
a servitude of passage. 9
Unlike article 689, article 694 does not require that the passage be
exercised along the shortest route or that the burdened estate be
indemnified. Also, only the vendee in an alienation of property or the
recipient of an enclosed estate in a partition may exercise the
gratuitous right of passage.2"
While articles 689 and 694 are mechanisms for granting passage
to public roads, article 693 precludes passage. It states that "[i]f an
16. For general information on the right of passage and how similar civilian
jurisdictions treat the right of passage, see 4 A.N. Yiannopoulous, Predial
Servitudes, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (2d ed. 1997); A.N. Yiannopoulos,
The Legal Servitude of Passage,71 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (1996); A.N. Yiannopoulos,
EnclosedEstates;Louisianaand ComparativeLaw, 23 Loyola L. Rev. 343 (1977);
and A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property,35 La. L. Rev. 266 (1975).
17. La. Civ. Code art. 689.
18. Id. See also La. Civ. Code art. 692 which states: "The owner of the
enclosed estate may not demand the right of passage anywhere he chooses. The
passage generally shall be taken along the shortest route from the enclosed estate
to the public road at the location least injurious to the intervening lands."
19. La. Civ. Code art. 694.
20. See Spotsville v. Hebert & Murrell, Inc., 698 So. 2d 31 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1997).
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estate becomes enclosed as a result ofa voluntary act or omission of
its owner, the neighbors are not bound to furnish passage to him or
his successors."'" Article 693 was added during the 1977 revision,
and is derived from other jurisdictions' laws as well as existing
Louisiana jurisprudence.22 In discussions prior to enacting article
693, the redactors contemplated that the article and accompanying
comment should put a seller on notice that he should retain a right of
passage when alienating and encumbering his land.23 Article 693 is
based on Greek Civil Code article 1014, which provides that "[a]n
obligation of the neighbours to grant a right ofway shall not exist if
the communications between the immovable and the public road have
ceased by means of a wilful act or omission of the owner of the
immovable. 24 Other civil codes provide for such an exception as
well. For example, German Civil Code article 918(1) provides that:
"[t]he obligation to tolerate the right ofway does not arise, if the prior
connection of the piece of land with the public road has been
eliminated by an arbitrary act of the owner."2
Article 693 is also similar to the way that common law
jurisdictions interpret their equivalent to the right of passage, a
servitude by necessity. A servitude of necessity is implied by law
whenever the landowner would be deprived ofreasonable use of his
property without the servitude.26 However, the servitude by necessity
is often denied when the estate's enclosure was a result of a voluntary
alienation of property by the estate's owner" or the landowner had
notice that voluntary acts on his behalf would create his enclosure.2"
21. La. Civ. Code art. 693.
22. Id.
23. Louisiana State Law Institute, Revision of Code Book II of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 at 99 (June 7, 1975).
24. Civ. Code art. 1014 (Constantine Taliadoros, LL.D., trans. 1982) (Greece).
25. §918 BGB (Ian S. Forrester, Simon L. Goren & Hans-Michael Ilgen, trans.

1975) (F.R.G.).
26. A servitude by necessity is defined as:
A conveyance that would otherwise deprive the land conveyed to
the grantee, or land retained by the grantor, ofrights necessary to
reasonable enjoyment of the land implies the creation of a
servitude granting or reserving such rights, unless the language or
circumstances of the conveyance clearly indicate that the parties
intended to deprive the property of those rights.
Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes § 2.15, 202 (2000).

27. See Shive v. Schaefer, 484 N.E.2d 394, 396 (I11.
App. 5th Dist. 1985)
("Plaintiffsimply created his own problem by voluntarily conveying away all means
of access to his retained property in 1955 and 1957.") andGulotta v. Triano, 608
P.2d 81, 82 (Ariz. App. 1980) ("A landowner may not acquire a way of necessity
over another's property after he has voluntarily cut off an alternate means ofaccess
to his own property.").
28. See O'Hara v. Chicago Title and Trust Company, 450 N.E.2d 1183, 1190
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Finally, article 693 draws from prior Louisiana jurisprudence that
denied passage to estates that were enclosed because of their owners'
acts. For example, in English Realty Co., Inc. v. Meyer,29 the plaintiff
sought passage over the defendant's property claiming it was the most
convenient route. The plaintiff's passage to the public road was
limited because the plaintiff had sold parts of his land to various
persons and retained only a distant portion of the tract for himself.3 °
Because the plaintiff had caused his own predicament, the court
denied the plaintiff passage. 3' The same rationale behind article 693
was reflected when the court stated:
[I]f plaintiff, by reason of the various property sales it has
made, now finds itself in the position of holding acreage
fronting that part of the overpass approach to which
[defendant] might be justified in refusing to grant it access
from its property, it is nevertheless not entitled to claim
passage over defendants' property as the situation respecting
access of which it now complains was wholly created by its
own act.32
EnglishRealtyindicates that Louisiana employed a rationale towards
the right of passage similar to its civilian and common law sisters
before article 693 was enacted.33
2. Criticism ofArticle 693
Article 693 is poorly drafted because the "voluntary act or
omission" standard it sets is both vague and ambiguous. The article's
broad language lacks any reference to specific situations or examples
to which its interpreters could apply article 693 to.34 Articles 689 and
(Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1983) (Where plaintiff renovated his restaurant and had written
notice that such renovations would result in enclosure, he was precluded from
receiving an easement of necessity).
29. 82 So. 2d 698 (La. 1955).
30. Id.
31. The Court also denied the plaintiff passage because they found that he did

have actual access to the public road. However, the Court noted that even if the
plaintiff was actually landlocked, he still would not be entitled to passage. Id. at
701.
32. Id.

33. See also Henry v. Rembert, 336 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976) and
Brown v. Terry, 103 So. 2d 541 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958) (Court overturned a grant
of a gratuitous right of passage to a landowner who had enclosed his land during
an exchange. The Brown court converted the gratuitous right of passage into a
passage with indemnity.).

34. The Supreme Court recognized this ambiguity as well in trying to apply
article 693:
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694 are extremely generous in granting passage to enclosed
landowners, even when the enclosure was created by a partition.
However, article 693's exception is so broad that it gives any
landowner trying to resist an action for passage at least one defense.
If the adverse landowner goes far enough down the chain of title, he
is probably going to find some action that could be classified as a
"voluntary act or omission." The result is that article 693 serves as
a "road-block" to all claims made under articles 689 and 694, an
effect clearly contrary to the Louisiana Supreme Court's prerogative
"of favoring the right of passage." Because of this effect, courts
3
should interpret article 693 narrowly.
3. Application ofArticle 693
Once article 693 was enacted, Louisiana courts had to reconcile
it with the existing jurisprudence that favored granting a right of
passage to enclosed estates. This policy was first established in the
Louisiana Supreme Court decision of Rockholt v. Keaty,36 in which
the court explained:
While [the right of passage] has been generally accepted as
designed to benefit the landowner so he could produce profit
for himself and obtain full utility ofhis land, it must now be
deemed also to offer protection of public interest. As land
becomes less available, more necessary for public habitation,
use, and support, it would run contrary to public policy to
encourage landlocking of such a valuable asset and forever
removing it from commerce and from the public as well as
private benefit."

Article 693 brings to the statutory scheme a certain tension, if not
ambiguity. By virtue of articles 689 and 694 an enclosed
landowner is entitled to a right ofpassage irrespective of how the
enclosure came to pass. Ifthe owner ofthe enclosed estate simply
has no access to a public road, he must indemnify his neighbor for
the damage he causes. If a partition (or alienation) causes the
enclosure, passage is to be gratuitously furnished. Yet, article 693
relieves a neighbor of the obligation to furnish a right of passage
if there has been a voluntary act or omission on the part of the
landowner who is demanding the right.
Leblanc v. Thibodeaux, 615 So. 2d 295, 298 (La. 1993).
35. This is exactly what the courts have done. See infra § II(B)(3). For the
author's suggestion on alternative language that could be used in article 693, see
infra § III.
36. 237 So. 2d 663 (La. 1970).
37. Id. at 668.
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This language arguably creates a presumption in favor ofgranting the
right ofpassage to all estates that become enclosed. Furthermore, this
jurisprudential policy was endorsed by the redactors when enacting
article 693.38 Thus, article 693 requires a balance between a statutory
restriction on granting enclosed estates passage and a policy that
discourages enclosing estates.
Louisiana courts reached this balance by favoring a narrow
application of article 693. In Leblanc v. Thibodeaux, 39 the Louisiana
Supreme Court determined that article 693 could not be applied to
preclude an indemnified right ofpassage to an enclosed estate which
had become enclosed after a conventional right of passage had
prescribed after ten years ofnonuse.4 ° According to the court, article
693 was an exception to the neighbor's obligation to provide passage
and was only "triggered by a voluntary act or omission of an
owner."41' Examining the Louisiana Law Institute's transcripts from
the 1977 revision, the court concluded that the drafters intended
article 693 to apply only to vendors who sold their property and
caused it to become enclosed because they failed to reserve a right of
passage and prevent the enclosure.42 The court also analyzed the
Rockholt decision and concluded that the comment to article 693
indicated that the legislature intended to maintain the Rockholt
policy.4 3 From these sources, the court determined that article 693
would be applied narrowly, that is "only to instances where the
enclosed estate's owner [had] caused his dilemma by selling off his
access property, or at least by not applying [it] where the voluntary
'alienation' which causes the enclosure is a partition, which is
governed by [Articles 689 and 694]."

38. "[Article 693 did] not change the law. Cf. Rockholt v. Keaty." La. Civ.
Code art. 693, cmt. a. (citation omitted).
39. 615 So. 2d 295 (La. 1993).

40. Id. at 296.
41. Id. at 298.
42. The Leblanc court concluded:
The drafters apparently contemplated that article 693's exception
would negate the right of passage otherwise afforded by article
689 where the enclosure has been created by the owner's sale of
his access property, for the entire focus of their discussion was on
how the law would affect vendors. Their statements demonstrate
that this article was drafted primarily to address a vendor's
voluntary act or omissions, where the vendor fails to reserve a
right of passage after his land becomes enclosed as a result of his
sale of adjoining property (footnote omitted).

Id. at 299 (emphasis in original).
43. Id.

44. Leblanc v. Thibodeaux, 615 So. 2d 295, 299 (La. 1993).
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The narrow standard established in Leblanchas been consistently
applied to article 693 cases, and most often results in courts refusing
to apply the exception. 5 Spotsville v. Hebert&Murrell,Inc.46 is one
of the few cases where a court used article 693 to preclude an
enclosed estate from receiving passage. In Spotsville, the plaintiff
sold two acres to the defendant and retained ownership of the
remaining 1.86 acres. As a result of the sale, the plaintiffs tract
became enclosed without access to a public road.47 The plaintiff filed
suit to obtain a gratuitous right ofpassage. The third circuit held on
appeal that the plaintiff was not entitled to a right ofpassage because
the enclosure was caused by the plaintiffs voluntary act or
omission." The court based its decision on Leblanc and found that
article 693 only applied to vendors who had failed to reserve a right
of passage in the actual sale.49
Spotsville is important because it favors a strict interpretation of
article 693. Because it is one ofthe few cases that actually denies an
enclosed estate the right of passage under article 693, it is crucial to
note that Spotsville is a mere application of the narrow rule
enunciated in Leblanc. Article 693, according to the interpretation
given by the Louisiana Supreme Court, should apply "only to
instances where the enclosed estate's owner has caused his dilemma
by selling off his access property."50 Thus, Leblanc v. Thibodeaux

45. Louisiana courts are hesitant to apply article 693 to deny enclosed estate
owners a right of passage over neighboring estates. The article is raised often by
defendants in an action for right of passage, but has been virtually useless to
Louisiana courts. See Griffith v. Cathey, 762 So. 2d 29,36 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ
denied, 771 So. 2d 85 (2000) (court declined to apply article 693 to deny a right of
passage to a purchaser who knowingly or voluntarily acquires enclosed property);
Holmes v. Parish of St. Charles, 653 So. 2d 653 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988) (without
applying article 693, court denied passage to landowner whose estate became
enclosed after the landowner donated land to a municipality conditioned on the
municipality building a road that would subsequently give the landowner passage,
but the municipality did not fulfill the condition within a reasonable time); Watts
v. Baldwin, 662 So. 2d 519 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1995) (article 693 was not applicable
to petitioners who were not "owners who [had] enclosed their estate by selling off
access property to the nearest public road underLeblancv. Thibodeaux," but rather
had acquired the property); and Atkins v. Johnson, 535 So. 2d 1063 (La. App. 2d
Cir. 1988) (court granted passage to heirs whose estates had become enclosed after
partitioning a large tract of land that had been donated to heirs mortis causa and
declined to apply article 693 as the defendants had argued).
46. 698 So. 2d 31 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
47. Id. at 32.
48. Id. at 34.
49. Id. at 33.
50. Leblanc v. Thibodeaux, 615 So. 2d 295, 299 (La. 1993).

2002]

NOTES

should be construed as the jurisprudential standard for applying the
broad language of article 693."'
4. No Application to ForcedTransactions
In addition to the limited Leblanc standard, article 693's scope
has been narrowed further by the courts' unwillingness to apply the
article to forced transactions. For example, courts have not applied
Article 693 in the context of an expropriation, in which the
government takes land for public use thus causing an enclosure, even
where the landowner failed to procure passage during the
expropriation process. In Bouser v.Morgan,52 the plaintiffs granted
a servitude to the Red River Waterway District that resulted in their
property becoming enclosed. 53 Although the plaintiffs granted the
servitude, they did so under the "threat ofexpropriation." ' They did
not request a right of passage during the expropriation process, but
instead later sued to obtain passage over the adjacent property. The
defendants claimed that the plaintiffs were not entitled to passage
because, under article 693, they had voluntarily granted the servitude
without procuring passage. The court granted the plaintiffs passage."
The courts did not preclude passage in the context of an
expropriation in Rockholt v. Keat 6 either." In Rockholt, the
plaintiff s property became landlocked because of an expropriation
to build an interstate.5" Reasoning that an expropriation was not
voluntary, the court acknowledged that the plaintiffs had a right to
passage even though the plaintiffs had not taken measures to reserve
passage during the expropriation process.59

51. For an alternative view, see A.N. Yiannopoulos, The Legal Servitude of
Passage,71 Tul. L.Rev. 1,25 (1996) inwhich Professor Yiannopoulous states that
the Leblanc standard is mere dictum and is not limited solely to the situations
described in the opinion: "[T]he dictum limiting [Article 693] to enclavements
resulting from the sale of access property is neither a reasonable interpretation of
the provisions ofthe Louisiana Civil Code governing the legal servitude ofpassage,
nor a solution conforming to legislative intent."
52. 520 So. 2d 937 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).

53. Id. at 938-39.
54. Id. at 939.
55. Id.

56. 237 So. 2d 663 (La. 1970).
57. The author acknowledges that Rockholt was decided before article 693 was

passed; however, Louisiana courts adhered to the principle ofarticle 693 before it
was actually enacted. See supra §ll(B)(3).
58. Rockholt, 237 So. 2d at 664-65.
59. Id. at 667-68. Although the court reasoned that the plaintiffs were entitled

to passage, the Rockholt court ultimately denied the plaintiffs passage inthis case.

The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had not sought passage to a public road as
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Courts have also not applied article 693 when enforcing the law
would result in an estate becoming enclosed. In Salvex, Inc. v.
Lewis,' the plaintiff purchased a pipeline servitude that was
previously exercised by two oil companies. As Louisiana law
required, the oil companies had executed releases of the eastern61
portion ofthe property because it was not producing any oil or gas.
This release caused the remainder ofthe estate to become enclosed.62
The plaintiff sued for a right of passage to the nearest public road.63
The defendants argued that article 693 precluded Salvex from
claiming a right ofpassage because its ancestors in title, the two oil
companies, had executed the releases without procuring a right of
passage.' The court granted the plaintiff passage, finding that the
enclosure was not "voluntary" under article 693 because the releases
were executed in order to comply with Louisiana oil and gas
conservation laws.65
This rationale also appears inLeblancv. Thibodeaux.66 There, the
plaintiffs claimed that article 693 did not prevent a legal servitude of
passage if a prior conventional right ofpassage was lost by nonuse.6 7
The plaintiffs' estate had become enclosed as a result of the
prescription of nonuse, an effect of written law. The court declined
to apply article 693 and granted the plaintiffs passage
because their
6
estate became enclosed as an effect of written law.
C. The Fourth Circuit'sAnalysis In Petrovich v. Trabeau
The fourth circuit denied Petrovich a right of passage over
Trabeau's property for three main reasons. First, the court reasoned
that losing land to pay off creditors in a sheriffs sale was a
"voluntary act or omission" under article 693.69 The court also held

required by the Code and that plaintiffs could have sought a right of passage over
a shorter, more direct, and more feasible route. Id. at 668.
60. 546 So. 2d 1309 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 551 So. 2d 1323 (1989).
61. "Pursuant to Louisiana mineral law, [they] were obligated to release that
part of the property which was not producing any oil or gas." Id. at 1315 [citing
Noel Estate, Inc. v. Murray, 65 So. 2d 886 (La. 1953); and Vance v. Hurley, 41 So.
2d 724 (La. 1949)].
62. Salvex, Inc., 546 So. 2d at 1315.
63. Id.at 1311. Salvex also requested recognition ofa servitude ofpassage for
a pipeline; however, the court declined to extend the legal servitude of a right of
passage to pipelines. Id. at 1314.
64. Id. at 1315.
65. Id.
66. 615 So. 2d 295 (La. 1993).
67. Id. at 300. See also supra § II(B)(3).
68. Leblanc, 615 So. 2d at 300.
69. Petrovich v. Trabeau, 780 So. 2d 1258, 1259-60 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
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that a gratuitous right of passage was not available to Petrovich
because it was only available to landowners who acquired enclosed
lands.70 Finally, the court reasoned that Petrovich had specifically
abandoned his prior right of passage over Trabeau's property,
indicating a contractual intent to no longer have Trabeau's land
burdened with a servitude. 7'
The court first denied Petrovich a right ofpassage because "[t]he
Civil Code clearly states that when a vendor, through his or her
voluntary act or omission, loses a right ofpassage. . ., [he] is not
entitled to a right ofpassage under the law."7 Because Petrovich had
lost the land with access to the highway in a sheriffs sale caused by
his failure to pay creditors, the court classified his actions as being
voluntary under article 693. The court reasoned that the Civil Code
intended to grant a servitude only to persons whose land had become
enclosed "through no fault of their own," and to allow a servitude to
someone who "[had voluntarily lost a right of passage" was against
the redactor's intent.13 Thus, the court found that a sheriffs sale was
a "voluntary act or omission" under article 693.' 4
The court next resolved the conflict between articles 693 and 694
and found that Petrovich was not entitled to a gratuitous right of
passage under article 694. Utilizing dicta from Spotsville v. Hebert
&Murrell,Inc.," the court reasoned "the right to demand a gratuitous
passage is accorded to one who acquiresan enclosed estate as a result
of a voluntary alienation of property."76 Because Petrovich had not
acquired the enclosed land as a result of the sheriffs sale, but instead
the land was transformed into an enclosed estate because of the
sheriff's sale, the court held he was not entitled to a gratuitous right
of passage. Here, the court narrowly read Spotsville and focused on
the word "acquire" instead of looking at the totality of the
circumstances as to how Petrovich's estate had become enclosed.7 7
denied, 793 So. 2d 1251 (2001).
70. Id. at 1260.
71. Id. at 1261.
72. Id. at 1260.
73. Id.
74. Though the court is firm throughout the opinion that losing one's property
in a sheriff's sale is a voluntary act or omission, the court also stated that "[ilt might
have been possible for [Petrovich] to argue that a [s]heriff's sale is a forced
transaction, which by its nature is not voluntary." Petrovich,780 So. 2d at 1260-61.
Here, the court is forwarding an argument that Petrovich may have been entitled to
passage across the land he lost in the sheriff's sale and does not fully explain their
retreat from what is otherwise a strong holding. Id.
75. 698 So. 2d 31 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997).
76. Petrovich, 780 So. 2d at 1260 (quoting Spotsville v. Herbert & Murrell,
Inc., 698 So. 2d 31 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis theirs)).
77. Id.
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The court finally denied Petrovich a right of passage because he
had abandoned his original right of passage over Trabeau's property
in the 1993 partition. Relying heavily on Louisiana authorities on
conventional servitudes, the court found the partition to be a specific
abandonment of any rights to passage he had over Trabeau's land.
Because the partition was intentional, the court held Petrovich was no
longer entitled to passage.78
III. CONCLUSIONS

The fourth circuit's analysis in Petrovichv. Trabeauis a change
in the way that Louisiana courts have traditionally applied article 693.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has inferred article 693 "voluntariness"
in instances in which the enclosed estate's owner causes his own
dilemma by selling his access property without reserving a right of
passage.79 Subsequent courts applied this inference strictly and
refused to apply article 693 in cases where a landowner voluntarily
executed a servitude agreement under threat of expropriation or
enclosure because of a partition."0 From the analyses in these cases,
one could conclude that article 693 would apply in few instances.
However, Petrovichdeparts from these cases and broadens the scope
of article 693 by classifying a sheriffs sale as a "voluntary act or
omission" under Article 693.8" A sheriffs sale is not a voluntary
transaction; rather, it is a forced sale in which the landowner is
virtually powerless.8 2 In doing this, Petrovich, for the first time,
defines article 693 "voluntariness" as having the literal meaning of
the word "voluntary."83 Thus, the fourth circuit's classification raises
questions about the potential application of article 693 and whether
or not it has been expanded.
The potential expansion of article 693 occurs in the source of the
obligation that failure to satisfy leads to article 693 applicability.
Doctrinally, obligations are said to arise from two sources-juridical
acts andjuridical facts." Obligations arising from juridical acts arise

78. Id.

79. Leblanc v. Thibodeaux, 615 So. 2d 295, 299 (La. 1993). See alsosupra
§ II(B)(3).
80.
81.

See supra §§ ll(B)(3) and H(B)(4).
Petrovich,780 So. 2d at 1261.

82. "[E]xecution sale. Aforced sale of a debtor's property by a government
official carrying out a writ of execution. Also termed forced sale; judicial sale;
sheriffs sale." Black's Law Dictionary 1338 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
83. There is nothing "uncivilian" about this. "The words of a law must be
given their generally prevailing meaning." La. Civ. Code art. 11.
84. See 6 Saul Litvinoff, Obligations: Book I, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law
Treatise § 63 (1969).
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from legal transactions that are a result of the parties' willful
determination. However, obligations that arise from juridical facts
are a result of obligations imposed by the law. They are a
consequence ofthe social order that the legal order regulates."5 Past
article 693 jurisprudence applied the exception only to juridical acts6
such as contractual alienations or encumbrances of one's property.1
However, a sheriffs sale is a procedural remedy that arises solely
from the law. It is a unilateral act involving only one will with no
meeting of the minds. In essence, Petrovich defines article 693
"voluntariness" as now including enclosures resulting from juridical
facts.
The problem with the manner in which Petrovich defines
"voluntariness" is that it is a definition that has never been used in
this context before. The legislative intent in enacting article 693 was
to address a vendor's voluntary acts or omissions where the vendor
fails to reserve a right of passage in the act of sale. 7 Further,
Louisiana courts traditionally only applied article 693 to enclosures
resulting from juridical acts. Petrovichhas thus created ambiguity as
to whether enclosures resulting from juridical facts should be
included in the scope of article 693. This ambiguity is significant as
Petrovichcould be given greater weight than the average circuit court
opinion because this is an area in which jurisprudence is scarce. For
example, a recent first circuit opinion cites Petrovichfor the rule that
the intention of the civil code was to allow those people whose land
is enclosed through no fault of their own a right of passage.8 8 The
word "fault" is synonymous withjuridical facts because an obligation
derived from one's fault is not the result of two independent wills.
This indicates that the jurisprudential expansion ofarticle 693 is now
in full progress.
Although Petrovich presents a strong argument for expanding
article 693 "voluntariness," there are several aspects of the opinion
85.
86.
87.

Litvinoff, supranote 84, at 93.
See supra§§ II(B)(3) and II(B)(4).
The drafters apparently contemplated that article 693's
exception would negate the right of passage otherwise
afforded by article 689 where the enclosure has been created
by the owner's sale of his access property, for the entire focus
oftheir discussion was on how the law would affect vendors.
Their statements demonstrate that this article was drafted
primarily to address a vendor's voluntary act or omissions,
where the vendor fails to reserve a right of passage after his
land becomes enclosed as a result of his sale of adjoining
property (footnote omitted).
Leblanc v. Thibodeaux, 615 So. 2d 295, 299 (La. 1993). See alsosupra note 23.
88. Sceroler v. Rancher, 808 So. 2d 803 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2002) (emphasis
added).
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that leave open the question of whether this expansion actually
occurred. First, the court does not explain the type ofdebt that led to
the sheriffs sale, resulting in ambiguity as to which acts actually
would invoke article 693.s9 IfPetrovich's debt was for property taxes
or to pay off a mortgage, then the court's rationale would be
understandable because these debts are associated with maintaining
one's property. It would be reasonable to interpret article 693 to bar
passage if the landowner did not pay the essential costs required to
retain ownership of his land. However, if Petrovich's debt was to
satisfy a tort judgment against him, a child support obligation, or a
debt for an unrelated purchase, such as a car, then the degree of
voluntariness required to invoke article 693 is broadened by
Petrovichconsiderably. Since the court does not indicate the type of
debt that Petrovich owed in the opinion, it is uncertain which acts are
now voluntary under article 693.
Second, regardless of the range of actions the court intended
article 693 to encompass, they expressed doubt as to whether
Petrovich's acts were voluntary when they said, "[iut might have been
possible for [Petrovich] to argue that a [s]heriff s sale is a forced
transaction, which by its nature is not voluntary." 9° This is a
contradiction of the earlier statement in which the court classifies
Petrovich's act as being voluntary and raises questions as to whether
the court's reasoning is even based on article 693. 91 This doubt may
indicate that the opinion is actually based more on the court's
conventional servitude analysis. The fourth circuit relied heavily
upon the partition between Petrovich and Trabeau, where Petrovich
waived his right to passage over Trabeau's property, in denying
Petrovich the servitude. Unfortunately, the court did not reconcile the
servitude abandonment with article 693, which it purports to be the
true basis of their opinion. 92
The preceding paragraphs represent that Petrovich v. Trabeau
creates an ambiguity in the way that future courts should interpret
article 693. There is a strong argument that Petrovich redefines
article 693 "voluntariness" to include enclosures that result from
juridical facts. This definition makes it easier for article 693 to
preclude passage to the owners of enclosed estates. However, there
is also a persuasive argument that Petrovichdoes not change article
693 and that the opinion was instead based on conventional
abandonment. Currently, these ambiguities must be resolved
89. Petrovich v. Trabeau, 780 So. 2d 1258, 1260-61 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 793 So. 2d 1251 (2001).

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1260.
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according to the demeanor of the judge, thus making it risky to try a
case in which article 693 is an issue. For this reason, the legislature
should intervene and clarify its intent in drafting article 693. If the
legislature wants to maintain the Louisiana Supreme Court standard
and limit article 693's application to enclosures resulting from
juridical acts, then it should redraft the law to include the exact
language used in Leblanc v. Thibodeaux. However, if the legislature
wants to expand article 693, as Petrovichdid, then it should redraft
the law to replace the words "voluntary act or omission '9 3 with a less
ambiguous 94and more specific phrase that includes words such as
"arbitrary," "negligent," or "fault." Ifthe legislature intended article
693 to encompass acts independent of the actual sale, these words
will make its intent clear. Until this needed intervention occurs,
Louisiana property lawyers face the prospect ofmore enclosed estates
becoming permanently fenced in.
Scott D. Huffstetler"

93. La. Civ. Code art. 693.
94. Cf § 918 BGB (Ian S. Forrester, Simon L. Goren & Hans-Michael Ilgen,
trans. 1975) (F.R.G.): "The obligation to tolerate the right of way does not arise,
if the prior connection ofthe piece ofland with the public land has been eliminated
by an arbitrary act of the owner." See also supra note 25.
* This comment is dedicated to the memory ofLee Hargrave, Wex S. Malone
Professor Emeritus, Louisiana State University. Professor Hargrave died recently
after a short battle with cancer. I am honored that this paper was advised by a true
Louisiana legal legend who influenced the development of our civil law system in
so many different capacities. His greatest gift to me was his style of writing-clear,
short, and concise. It is a style that I will carry with me throughout my legal career.
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